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Beginning a book about whales and whaling with a survey of  literary refer- 
ences has canonical authority. Melville himself ([  185  11 1983, ix) begins Moby- 
Dick not with “Call me Ishmael” but with “Etymology” (our version is in chap- 
ter 2) and “Extracts,” an anthology of eighty-one quotations “affording a glanc- 
ing bird’s eye view of what has been promiscuously said, thought, fancied, and 
sung of Leviathan.’” Naturally enough, the first extract is Genesis 1:21, “And 
God created great whales”; Melville includes also three biblical passages that 
refer to Leviathan, and Jonah  1 :  17-“Now  the Lord had prepared a great fish 
to swallow up Jonah.”* He moves on to Plutarch (“what thing soever. . .  com- 
eth within the chaos of this monster’s mouth . . .  down it goes all incontinently 
that foul great swallow of his”) and Lucian (“a great many Whales and other 
monsters of the sea appeared”), among the ancients; Wharton the Whale Killer 
(“he saw the distended jaws of a large Sperm Whale close to the head of the 
boat, threatening it with instant destruction”), among the moderns. More than 
one-half  of  Melville’s selections make the point that whales are very large, 
many others, that they are evil or monstrous. 
Melville disingenuously  credits  a librarian  with having compiled  his ex- 
tracts, but acknowledges in the phrase “a glancing bird’s eye view” that they 
are a far from exhaustive survey. The bulk of references to whales in English 
I. Much of Moby-Dick is about the process of writing the novel; in that context scholars have 
seen “Extracts” as Melville’s bid to make himself a part of the community of  authors (i.e., of  the 
literary tradition) who wrote about whales. That is, he wanted his individual labors-labors  that 
were directed toward whaling-to  be included in the much greater body of  labor about whales in 
general (Cindy Weinstein, private communication, 26 October 1994). 
2. We have adopted the literary use of Leviathan as an equivalent for whale, but this may not be 
what the Hebrew writers intended. The biblical Leviathan is not a large mammal; in Melville’s 
version of Isaiah 27:1, it is the “crooked serpent. . . the dragon that is in the sea.” See Ellis 1991, 
34. The “great fish” that made a meal of Jonah, however, is understood to have been a whale: “For 
as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale’s belly” (Matthew 12:40). 2  Chapter 1 
literature  are less flamboyant than those he has  selected. Compare, for ex- 
ample, Milton’s description, which was chosen by Melville, with Christopher 
Smart’s, which was not. Milton is expansive and audacious (and factually mis- 
taken): 
There Leviathan 
Hugest of living creatures, on the deep 
Stretch’d like a promontory sleeps or 
And seems a moving land,3  and at his gills 
Draws in, and at his trunk spouts out a sea.4 
swims, 
Smart is subdued, modest, and affecting: 
Strong, the gier-eagle on his sail, 
Strong against tide, the enormous whale 
Emerges as he goes5 
When a literary whale is not large and evil, what is it? According to Chaucer, 
it is fat; in “The Summoner’s Tale,” monks are said to be “fat as a whale.” 
According to Shakespeare, it is hungry: 
And there they fly or die, like scaled schools 
Before the belching whale. 
I knew the young Count to be a dangerous and lascivious boy,  who is a 
whale to virginity and devours up all the fry it finds. 
I can compare our rich misers to nothing so fitly as to a whale; ’a plays and 
tumbles, driving the poor fry before him, and at last devours them all at 
a mouthful.6 
This characteristic  gave rise  to the proverb “Throw out a  sprat  to catch a 
whale,” and, if the whale is hungry enough, to the proverb ‘‘Throw out a tub to 
the whale,” meaning offer the voracious one something other than you or your 
boat to swallow. 
3. “Stories are found in the folklore of many languages about sailors mistaking a sleeping whale 
for an island they moor their ship to it and go ashore to prepare a meal, whereupon the whale 
awakes and dives, drowning the men and dragging their ship to the bottom. This story is incorpo- 
rated in the legend of St. Brendon . . . ,  the Irish Benedictine abbot who, in A.D.  565, is said to 
have sailed west into the Atlantic to search for the Promised Land of the Saints. In the course of 
this voyage he and his men landed on the back of an immense whale, mistaking it for an island. 
The saint set up an altar and celebrated the Mass; he did not suffer the usual result of making this 
mistake” (Harrison Matthews et al. 1968.25). 
4. John Milton, Paradise Lost, book 7,  lines 412-16.  This is Milton’s gloss on Genesis. (A whale 
has neither gills nor a trunk, and breathes not water but air.) 
5.  Christopher Smart, A Song to David. A gier-eagle is a vulture. 
6. William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, act 5,  scene 5;  All’s Well That Ends Well, act 4, 
scene 3; Pericles, Prince of  Tyre, act 2, scene 1. 3  In Prospect 
In 1940 Walt Disney made an animated film of the late-nineteenth-century 
children’s book Pinocchio. In the original Italian, the marine creature that swal- 
lows Pinocchio is a Pesce-cane (dogfish), a large shark, “who, for his slaughter 
and for his insatiable voracity, had been named the  ‘Attila of fish and fish- 
ermen.’ Only think of poor Pinocchio’s terror at the sight of  the m~nster.”~  In 
the film the shark has become a whale named Monstro, and Pinocchio is every 
bit as frightened-although  considering that Geppetto, whom Pinocchio is out 
to rescue, has been living for weeks in Monstro’s belly along with his cat and 
his goldfish, and they are all eating and breathing just fine, one may wonder 
what the fuss is about. Did Disney make the change in order to allude to the 
story of  Jonah and reassure American children that it is possible to emerge 
from a whale alive? If so, the reassurance must be subliminal, for Monstro is 
decidedly bad-tempered and indefatigable. 
In recent years, as the whale fishery has receded and natural history has 
turned from finding prey to publicizing marvels, whales have changed com- 
pletely.* They are no longer dangerous, or disgusting. When Michelle Gilders 
writes  in  Rejections of  a  Whale-Watcher (1995,  3),  “This was  the  year  I 
touched a whale,” she is not saying, “This was the year I experienced terror 
and revulsion,” but, “This was the year I experienced awe.” In motion pictures, 
boys no longer risk their lives to  save humans from monstrous whales; now 
they risk their lives to save whales from monstrous humans. In 1956 Gregory 
Peck, as Captain Ahab, killed a ship’s crew by trying to kill a sperm whale. In 
1986 William Shatner, as James T.  Kirk, saved everyone on Earth by  saving 
two humpback whales from Norwegian  hunter^.^ 
In the present climate, in which the whale shares with the panda the status 
of  environmentalist  emblem, and northern  Californians stand alongside the 
Sacramento River anxiously urging a lost baby gray back to the ocean, and we 
are asked not simply to save whales but even perhaps to adopt one, it is an 
imaginative exercise to study a world industry that depended on slaughtering 
these fascinating and often beautiful creatures. 
7. The Pinocchio stories were written by Carlo Lorenzini and published under his pseudonym, 
Carlo Collodi, beginning in 1880. The quotation is from Collodi n.d., 235-36. 
8. At an extreme of  the marvellous might be Mind in the Waters (1974). in which, for example, 
John Lilly is quoted as saying, “I suspect that whales and dolphins quite naturally go in the direc- 
tions we call spiritual, in that they get into meditative states quite simply and easily” (83). Of 
another order entirely, and wonderfully written, is Roger Payne’s Among Whales (1995)-for  ex- 
ample, “In the past twenty years there has been repeated speculation about whether we or whales 
possess the greater intelligence. I have stayed out of  this discussion because it is obvious that we 
have no clear idea as to the nature of  the intelligence abiding in the brains of  whales (or our own, 
really). It all depends on what we mean by intelligence. If we mean an enduring intelligence, then 
whales are the winners hands down, simply because they have been around for tens of millions of 
years longer than we have. Besides, they do not use their extraordinary brains to do things that can 
destroy the world (346). 
9. Pinocchio  (1940). Free  Willy (1993), Moby Dick (1956). Star Trek IV: The  Voyage Home 
(1986). 4  Chapter 1 
1.1  American Whaling 
Whaling, today, is pursued by  small fleets of Norwegian and Japanese ves- 
sels, and by Inuit living beside the Arctic Ocean. In the context of the world 
economy, the  industry is minute.  Its supporters defend it, not on economic 
grounds, but for its cultural value or its putative contributions to scientific re- 
search.’O Most nations have agreed not to hunt whales at all; the United States 
not only prohibits hunting but also excludes whale products from American 
foreign trade. 
One hundred and fifty years ago, the world was different. Whaling was a 
major economic activity, and it was centered in the United States. In value of 
output, whaling was fifth among U.S. industries; it provided raw materials for 
the chief lighting and lubricating products of the day. New Bedford, Massachu- 
setts, the leading whaling port, was said to be the richest town in the country,“ 
and Hetty Green, later called the Witch of Wall Street, would shortly inherit 
two  New  Bedford  whaling  fortunes  and  become  the  wealthiest  woman  in 
America. There was no need to justify whaling in terms other than the eco- 
nomic. 
How the U.S. industry achieved this distinction and why it declined so rap- 
idly, disappearing before the end of the 1920s, are questions of substance, not 
grist for antiquarian mills. There are lessons to be learned from the history 
of American whaling that are germane to modem interests-indeed,  modem 
preoccupations. This book is concerned with these lessons. 
1.2  Economic Growth: Lessons from Whaling 
Economists since Adam Smith have been interested in economic growth and 
change, but, despite the lapse of more than two hundred years since he wrote, 
we have grasped only the principal outlines of the subject. As Nobel laureate 
Simon Kuznets demonstrated in 1930 (1967), the process is certainly related 
to the rise and decline of industries. Additionally, as he suggested in his presi- 
10. The cultural importance of whaling is asserted by Norwegians and Inuit. Japanese apologists 
claim scientific gains from hunting but, as Matthiessen (1995, 71) says, “‘scientific whaling’ . . . 
is generally considered a great fraud.” See also Cousteau and Paccalet 1988.47, for a harsh critique 
of what is called “aborigine whaling.” 
1  I. Or the world: “New Bedford, in the mid-nineteenth century, was perhaps the richest city per 
capita in the world” (Allen 1973, 82). “Probably no city in the Union, perhaps no city in the world 
can show such an amount of property in proportion to the number of inhabitants. Taking the last 
United States census as the basis of population, a division of  the wealth of the city would give to 
every man, woman and child in New Bedford, a fraction over $1615 each” (WSL  15 August 1854). 
The Whalemen’s Shipping List (WSL)  may have been right. According to the 1860 census, the 
total value of tax assessments per head in the United States was $385. (The census gives three 
different wealth estimates: tax assessments, census marshalls’ estimates of true value, and individ- 
ual census wealth returns. The WSL  seems to have been refemng to New Bedford tax assessments. 
[US. Census Office  1864b. 599; 1866, 2941). For more on New  Bedford wealth, see chapter 
10 below. 5  In Prospect 
dential address to the Third International Conference of  Economic History, 
technical change has been the “major permissive source of modern economic 
growth” (1968,20). Douglass North, co-Nobel laureate in 1993, was awarded 
the prize in part for his work on the role of institutional invention and innova- 
tion in the process of growth (Davis and North 1971; North and Thomas 1973; 
Wallis and North 1986). 
What else do we know? Technical changes may be central to the rise and 
fall of industries, but economic agents (entrepreneurs, workers, investors, con- 
sumers) play major roles. Moreover, the drama is enacted against a backdrop 
of institutions (property rights, labor contracts, government regulations, com- 
modity and factor markets). History can provide a laboratory-less  than ideal, 
but better than none at all. Evidence drawn from that laboratory can be used to 
check theories and suggest modifications. The quality of  the laboratory de- 
pends, of  course, on the relevance of the historical incidents to the problems 
under study. The American whaling industry is a nearly ideal laboratory for the 
study of economic change. 
First, the industry was dynamic, not static; because it was dynamic one can 
examine the effects of changes in technology, in institutions, and in the prefer- 
ences of  economic agents under a variety of  conditions. American whaling 
rose to world dominance, and then collapsed, within a single century. In terms 
of  capital stock, it employed an  annual average of  only eighteen thousand 
vessel-tons in the years  1816-20.  Over the next three decades, tonnage in- 
creased more than elevenfold. In 1896-1900, however, after a decline of many 
years, the capital stock was smaller than it had been in  1816-20.  (See table 
1.1.) In terms of the value of output, the story is much the same. In  1880 dol- 
lars, the industry’s average annual receipts grew from three-quarters of a mil- 
lion in 1816-20  to almost ten million in 1851-55,  but by  1901-5  had fallen to 
less than one million dollars. (See table 1.2.) 
Second, although a typical vessel made several whaling voyages (the mean 
number from New  Bedford was six), the owners and agents, who organized 
and directed the enterprise, treated each voyage as a separate venture. Thus, 
the voyage is an ideal unit of  analysis, virtually the same as thefirm of eco- 
nomic theory. Also useful is the fact that the industry was competitive; given 
competition, one can use economic models based on optimization and profit 
maximization with little distortion of reality. 
Third, in  some industries-agriculture  and  mining,  for  example-firms 
draw on a stock of locationally specific and privately owned resources, making 
it almost impossible to disentangle differences in natural endowment from dif- 
ferences in productivity. In whaling the natural resource (the stock of whales) 
was owned by no one, and all firms were normally free to exploit it. Finally, 
the production process was relatively simple: each of its stages-finding,  kill- 
ing, and rendering whales-is  easy to describe. 
Whaling was a nexus for almost all the forces that economists have  sug- 
gested are important to the processes of  growth and change. Accompanying Table 1.1  Tonnages and Numbers of Vessels, U.S. and New Bedford Whaling 
Fleets, Annual Averages, 1816-1905 
Tonnage  Number of Vessels 
New Bedford  New Bedford 
US.'  New Bedfordb  US.  US.'  New Bedfordd  us. 
-  I8 16-20  18,395  7,568  .411  -  31 
1821-25  37,161  14,701  ,396  -  56 
1826-30  47,953  23,105  ,482  -  8W 
1831-35  92,750  44,912  ,484 
1836-40  133,897  54,685  ,408 
1841-45  185,678  72,881  ,393  672  228  .339 
1846-50  208,347  82,035  ,394  656  252  ,384 
1851-55  195,938  105,482  ,538  628  314=  ,500 
1856-60  195,692  108,551  ,555  628  320'  ,510 
1861-65  111,167  73,026  ,657  374  220  ,588 
- 
- 
-  142'  - 
-  173  - 
1866-70  73,224  58,331  .797  312  180'  ,577 
1871-75  58,5148  39,888  .682  209  124'  ,593 
1876-80  46,5171  39,217  .843  178  129'  .725 
1881-85  40,8388  29,815  .730  152  96  .632 
1886-90  3 1,3648  18,492  ,590  113  59  ,522 
1891-95  24,1438  10,700  ,443  92  38  ,413 
1896-1900  15,588g  6,809  .437  62  26'  ,419 
190  1-5  10,4628  6,810  .65 1  40  23  .575 
The  U.S. annual average tonnage figures have been computed from annual data given in Tower 
1907, 121, appendix table 1. Tower uses the tonnages recorded when vessels were registered (i.e., 
contemporary tonnages). Since the system for computing tonnage changed in 1865, his figures for 
the years after 1864 are not perfectly comparable to those for earlier years. In the aggregate, post- 
1864 tonnages appear to have been from 10 to 25 percent smaller than pre-1865  tonnages (see 
chapter 3). We therefore adjusted Tower's U.S. tonnages by raising them 17.5 percent. We began 
the adjustment with the 1871-75  figure, since new tonnage evaluations were not all made in 1865, 
but in the years in  which vessels were reregistered. Reregistrations tended to take place when 
vessels sailed; given typical voyage lengths, the complete change must have taken three to six 
years. 
The  annual figures of which the table reports five-year averages were computed by  summing the 
tonnages of the New Bedford vessels that were involved in whaling voyages during a year. These 
annual figures underreport tonnages for two reasons. (1) Occasionally only the sailing date or only 
the arrival date of  a voyage is known; when one date is missing, we assumed the voyage was 
completed within the calendar year of the other date-but  voyages generally lasted longer than 
that. (2) We do not know the tonnages of seventeen New Bedford vessels active between 1816 and 
1905; their twenty-two voyages in this period do not figure in the annual sums. 
The figures for New Bedford annual average tonnage were computed from the Voyages Data 
Set (see chapter 3). We calculated the tonnage of each New Bedford vessel registered after 1864 
according to the law in effect before 1865 in order to arrive at an old-rule tonnage figure, and used 
those old-rule tonnages in calculating the New  Bedford averages. (All New Bedford tonnages 
reported in this book are old-rule tonnages.) 
cThe US.  annual average numbers of  vessels come from Tower 1907, 121. Tower's  counts of 
numbers of vessels in the U.S. fleet begin with 1843. The  1841-45  number here is therefore the 
average of only the three years 1843-45. 
dThe  New Bedford annual average numbers of vessels were computed from the Voyages Data Set. 
'This number is one greater than the average number of vessels for which tonnage is known, during 
these five years. See note b. 
This number is two greater than the average number of vessels for which tonnage is known, during 
these five years. See note b. 
&Adjusted  tonnage; see note a. 7  In Prospect 
Table 1.2  Real Value of Output, U.S. and New Bedford Whaling Fleets, Annual 
Averages, 1816-1905  (1880 dollars) 
U.S.  New Bedford  New BedfordlLTS 
1  8 16-20 
1 82 1-25 
1826-30 





































































Sources: Output prices come from a variety of sources, summarized in appendix 9A. The same 
prices were used to value both U.S. and New Bedford outputs. 
Output amounts for the United States come from Tower 1907, 126, appendix table 3. Output 
amounts for New Bedford were computed from the Voyages Data Set. 
Tower’s output series is not perfectly comparable to ours. In the first place, as his table note 
says, he used data from two sources: Starbuck 1878, and WSL  17 March 1843-29 December 1914. 
We used a wider variety of sources (see chapter 3). In the second place his series associates output 
with the year in which the output itself, not the vessel producing it, returned to port. Our series 
associates all the output of a voyage with the year in which the vessel returned to port, even though 
some of it may have been shipped home in advance of the vessel’s return. (This difference should 
roughly wash out in the five-year averages reported in this table.) 
Notes: The term real  value means current price value, deflated by the Warren and Pearson “All 
Commodities” wholesale price index (U.S.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52). 
the rise and decline of the industry, and presumably producing them, were (1) 
changes in the level and structure of demand; (2) changes in the competitive 
vigor of West Coast whaling ports and foreign fleets; (3) supply-side shocks, 
both positive (the discovery of new hunting grounds) and negative (perhaps 
the depletion of whale stocks); (4) changes in systems of business organization 
(the rise of  such ports as Honolulu and Panama as transshipment and refitting 
points, for example); (5) the innovation of  appropriate vessel sizes, rigging 
types, whalecraft,  and hunting techniques; and (6) changes in the cost and 
quality of capital and labor, and in the supply of entrepreneurial ability. 
Such changes are of great interest. An industry rises rapidly and then de- 
clines; the rise and decline carry important consequences for the institutional 
environment and for the level and structure of the capital stock; those factors, 
in turn, affect best-practice techniques, productivity, output, and employment. 8  Chapter 1 
This book centers on such developments, not as ends in themselves, but  as 
ways to investigate both the forces encouraging expansion and collapse and the 
responsiveness of economic agents to opportunities and problems. The goal is 
to investigate forces underlying economic growth and change and to under- 
stand how they function. 
To economists, usually faced with scrappy data, often indirect, the history 
of the American whaling industry is extraordinarily rich. Take only three ex- 
amples. In whaling, Kuznetsian technical change took the form not only of 
new vessel and whalecraft designs, but also of institutional innovations in both 
the industry and the general economic environment. Given the large number 
of firms (voyages), separated in space and time, the impact of these aspects of 
technical change can be studied in detail.I2 Second, questions of  managerial 
control-an  agent’s control over a captain working thousands of miles away, 
and a captain’s control of his crew-raise  issues at the heart of all principal/ 
agent problems. Here again, the laboratory yields many observations. Third, in 
a world marked by great risk (vessels sometimes sank and captains sometimes 
found few whales), and a world that required close cooperation between offi- 
cers and crewmen, the labor contract was extremely important. What was the 
nature of  the contract, and how efficient was it? These are but three of many 
topics that make the history of whaling relevant to modem analytical and inter- 
pretive concerns. 
1.3  The Plan of the Study 
If  this book were solely an economic history, it might best be organized 
chronologically.  Given the nature of our interests, however, an organization 
based on the microeconomic model-the  production function, input and out- 
put markets, firm behavior, and industrial response-is  more appropriate. 
The first section, chapters 1-3,  gives the raison d’&tre  and plan of  the study. 
Later in this chapter we introduce four aspects of whaling (the trends in pro- 
ductivity, the idiosyncratic labor contract, the entrepreneurs who made busi- 
ness decisions, and the products of the industry) that make it of particular inter- 
est to economists, and describe the central role played by New Bedford. In 
chapter 2 the whales (sperms, rights, humpbacks, grays, and bowheads) that 
Americans regularly  caught, as well as the whales (seis, blues, minkes, and 
finners) that they seldom managed to catch, are described. The chapter also 
gives a brief account of the development of hunting methods from the seven- 
teenth century to the early twentieth. Chapter 3 describes the contents and con- 
struction of the data sets on which our analyses are based. 
The second section, chapters 4-8,  focuses on the whaling production func- 
tion-the  process of converting physical inputs (land, capital, and labor) into 
12. The New Bedford fleet, for example, the largest component of the American fleet, made 
more than forty-three hundred whaling voyages between 1816 and 1906. 9  In Prospect 
physical outputs (sperm oil, whale oil, and whalebone). Chapter 4 describes 
the demography of whales, estimates their numbers in the oceans at the begin- 
ning and at the end of American whaling, and evaluates the impacts of Ameri- 
can hunting on whale populations. Chapter 5 describes the labor contract, dis- 
cusses both the lays-the  shares of  output received by  crewmen-and  the 
wages they represented, compares those earnings with wages in other indus- 
tries, and explores the relationship between manning decisions and productiv- 
ity. Chapter 6 describes nineteenth-century vessels and whalecraft (equipment 
used  to  catch  whales).  Chapter  7  describes  the  changes  in  vessels  and 
whalecraft, as well as in the institutions that governed cooperation and compe- 
tition, that took place during the American industry’s century-long life. Chapter 
8 models the production process, examines changes over time in the average 
productivity of New Bedford whaling voyages, and attempts to explain, for 
example, why the 1857 voyage of  the George Howland was more productive 
than its 1842 voyage, and why the New Bedford fleet was more productive in 
both 1825 and 1885 than it was in 1855. 
The third section, chapters 9-1  1, moves from questions of productivity nar- 
rowly defined to a more general evaluation of whaling firms as business enter- 
prises. Chapter 9 examines the evolution of the markets for the industry’s three 
major products. Its focus is on demand, with an emphasis on the development 
of substitutes and the role of foreign markets. Chapter 10 examines the roles 
of agents (the men who organized enterprises and exercised general control), 
captains (the men on the spot who made day-to-day decisions), and owners. It 
gives a quantitative assessment of the quality of  entrepreneurial responses to 
changing economic conditions. Chapter 11 computes the profits earned on in- 
dividual voyages, giving an alternative measure of the success of particular 
captains and agents. 
The fourth section, chapters 12 and  13, is largely historical. It traces the 
long-run fortunes of the industry, the result of the interplay of technology, mar- 
kets, and entrepreneurial creativity. Chapter 12 describes the competition be- 
tween the whaling fleets of the United States and Great Britain in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century and analyzes the reasons for initial British 
dominance and final American triumph. Chapter 13 describes the increasingly 
effective competition offered by  the Norwegian industry after  1880 and ex- 
plains the failure of the Americans to counter it. 
In the final chapter the major threads of  the argument are drawn together 
and related to the question of technical progress. In addition, we draw from the 
whaling  experience  some  general  ideas  about  technology  and  economic 
growth and decline. 
1.4  What the Reader Needs to Know 
No matter where one begins the story of American whaling, four subjects 
crop up: productivity, the labor contract, the entrepreneurs, and the markets for 10  Chapter 1 
whaling products. The reader should be introduced to them before embarking 
on this study of the economics of whaling. 
Managerial Decisions. Leaving aside luck (perhaps the most important factor), 
the productivity of a whaling venture was strongly influenced by  the choices 
of its agent as he planned the voyage. The first was the ground to be hunted. 
Registrations of New Bedford vessels list fifty, including such exotic places as 
Patagonia, Delagoa Bay, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Tristan da Cunha. We have 
generally grouped the fifty into four: the Atlantic, the Indian, the Pacific, and 
the Western Arctic. (For a list of the fifty grounds and their distribution among 
these four, see appendix 3A.j Parts of the first three grounds had been system- 
atically hunted before the War of 1812. The last, the Western Arctic, was first 
hunted in 1848, when Captain Thomas Welcome Roys sailed the bark Superior 
of Sag Harbor through the Bering Strait and found “whales innumerable, some 
of which  yielded two hundred  and eighty barrels of  oil”  (Scammon  [1874] 
1968, 58). 
A second choice was the class of  vessel and its size: a ship (three masts, 
square-rigged on all), a bark (three masts, square-rigged on the foremast and 
mainmast, fore-and-aft-rigged on the mizzen), a brig (two masts, square-rigged 
on both), a schooner (two masts, fore-and-aft-rigged on both), or a sloop (one 
mast, fore-and-aft-rigged).  On average,  ships were  larger than barks,  barks 
larger than brigs, brigs larger than schooners, and schooners larger than sloops, 
but within a rigging class there was a range of sizes, making some barks, for 
example,  larger  than  some ships.  (Size  was  expressed  in  tons-for  mer- 
chantmen and whalers a measure of capacity, not, as for warships, of displace- 
mentj.l3 The average size of the sixty-two whaling ships that sailed from New 
Bedford in 1850 was 368 tons, but they included the Leonidas at 231 tons and 
the Gladiator at 650. 
Manning decisions, too, affected productivity. Most whaling vessels were 
ships or  barks. Such a vessel had a captain, at least two mates, some number 
of boatsteerers (the men who harpooned the whales and steered the whaleboats 
when the whales ran), a cooper, a cook, a steward, and a number of seamen- 
some skilled (able seamen), some semiskilled (ordinary  seamen), some un- 
skilled (greenhands), and perhaps a boy or two. Choices remained. Should the 
vessel carry four, five, or six whaleboats? Depending on the decision, the agent 
would need to hire four, five, or six boatsteerers and three, four, or five mates. 
If the voyage was to be lengthy, the vessel would need a carpenter and a black- 
smith, and the agent might choose to add a boatbuilder, a sailmaker, perhaps a 
painter, As technology improved, it became possible to substitute greenhands 
for able and ordinary seamen, but this required not only more greenhands but 
also more supervisory personnel. Those sixty-two ships that left in 1850 car- 
ried an average crew of twenty-nine, but the number ranged from twenty-three 
13. See chapter 6 for a description of the legal formulas for computing tonnage. 11  In Prospect 
The Lagoda  was built in Scituate, Massachusetts, in 1826 and originally rigged as a 
ship. She was 107.75  feet long and 26.5 feet wide (an “old measure” tonnage of 340.7), 
with two decks, a square stem, and a billethead. The vessel came to New Bedford in 
1841 from Boston, where she had been employed as a merchant vessel. The Lagoda 
made six whaling voyages from New Bedford as a ship. In 1860 she was rerigged as a 
bark, in which guise she made another nine New Bedford voyages. During the last in 
1890, she was condemned and sold at Yokohama, Japan. Note the ensign of  her New 
Bedford agent, Jonathan Bourne Jr. 
This is a reproduction of a watercolor by Arthur Moniz (l991), used with the permis- 
sion of the Old Dartmouth Historical Society-New Bedford Whaling Museum. 
on the Ann Alexandel; the Barclay, the Iris, and the Leonidas, to thirty-six on 
the Globe. 
Finally, changes in technology forced agents to choose between new tech- 
niques and familiar ones. Early whaling vessels were drawn from the merchant 
fleet; if  whaling proved  unprofitable, they  could easily be returned. In  the 
1850s new modified clippers-barks  designed specifically for whaling-be- 
gan to appear, offering a choice between specialization and versatility. In rig- 
ging, some midcentury builders believed that a greater number of  small, flat 
sails was more efficient than a few large, baggy ones, and that wire rope or 
chain, although more costly, was better than the traditional hemp. In  equip- 
ment,  some  preferred  mechanized  ventilators,  capstans,  and  winches.  In 
whalecraft, suppliers offered double-flued, single-flued, and toggle irons (har- 
poons), iron and steel hand-lances, guns that shot explosive lances, and, after 12  Chapter 1 
the mid-l860s, darting guns, which could both harpoon and kill. Technical 
choices might affect a vessel’s  catch; they certainly affected the cost of  its 
voyage. 
The Measurement of  Productivify.  In the past two decades econometricians 
have made important contributions, both theoretical and empirical, to our abil- 
ity to measure total factor productivity. For this study, the most valuable has 
been the discovery that a class of multilateral index numbers can be used to 
measure intertemporal and interfirm productivity differences, making it unnec- 
essary to fit econometric functions. The implicit aggregator underlying the in- 
dex numbers is a translog functi~n.’~ 
The multilateral index used here to measure productivity comes from the 
work of  Douglas W.  Caves, Laurits R. Christensen, and W.  Erwin Diewert 
(1982b) and is particularly well suited to the whaling industry. It is designed 
to handle multiproduct firms; nineteenth-century whalers sought three prod- 
ucts. The economic model that underlies the index assumes optimizing behav- 
ior; firms in competitive industries such as whaling are forced by the market 
to minimize costs and maximize profits. Computation is simple and demands 
few data (see chapter 8). The index is, in essence, a ratio of physical outputs 
to  physical  inputs; higher  values mean  higher productivity, lower  values, 
lower productivity. 
Trends in Productivify. An index of the average productivity of the vessels re- 
turning to New Bedford in each year from 1816 to 1898 is shown in table 1.3 
and figure 1.1. It declines from 1826, when the New Bedford fleet was still 
quite small, to the mid-l830s, when it was quite large. Over the rest of  the 
century, there are significant, but less marked, changes. From the mid-1830s 
to the mid-l860s, the curve declines less sharply; from the mid-1860s to the 
end of the century, productivity increases again; by  1875  the index has returned 
to the level of the mid-1850s. 
There are at least three possible explanations of this pattern of movement. It 
has been said that the stocks of whales were hunted down as the industry grew. 
Fewer whales would mean greater costs, and a consequent decline in produc- 
tivity. This account is favored by some historians and many environmentalists. 
It is consistent with the movements of the index from the 1820s to the 1860s; 
it is not consistent with the movements in the years after the Civil War or with 
the pattern of hunting and the demography of whale populations (see chapters 
4  and 8). 
A less widely held view relates to changes in the industry’s size-the  entry 
of  vessels into and exit of vessels from the fleet. As the industry expanded, 
competition for whales would have grown more intense. More vessels search- 
14. See chapter 8 for citations. We thank Douglas Caves, V. Kerry Smith, Richard Hydell, Jef- 
frey Dubin, and David Guilkey, who discussed these indexes with us. 13  In Prospect 
Table 1.3  Index of Total Factor Productivity, New Bedford Whaling Fleet, 
1816-98  (mean 1816-98  = 100) 
Voyage  Index of  Voyage  Index of  Voyage  Index of 
Arrival Years  Productivity  Arrival Years  Productivity  Arrival Years  Productivity 
1816  205.187  1844  147.665  1872  55.910 
1817  130.220  1845  127.016  1873  66.000 
1818  168.956  1846  12 1.042  1874  55.531 
1819  162.123  1847  110.834  1875  7 1.037 
1820  141.365  1848  117.996  1876  8 1.374 
1821  153.469  1849  97.705  1877  88.315 
1822  154.630  1850  99.563  1878  66.319 
1823  146.732  1851  136.501  1879  58.654 
1824  138.809  1852  61.490  1880  55.268 
1825  240.176  1853  80.207  1881  80.483 
1826  224.315  1854  98.752  1882  67.929 
I827  151.401  1855  69.655  1883  79.300 
1828  186.284  1856  83.868  1884  68.286 
1829  172.617  1857  92.317  1885  49.683 
1830  179.60  1  1858  69.787  1886  58.310 
1831  144.790  1859  72.399  1887  50.770 
1832  173.576  1860  84.021  1888  33.240 
1833  161.495  1861  57.606  1889  99.503 
I834  114.068  1862  54.111  1890  82.690 
1835  84.01  1  1863  44.773  1891  124.665 
1836  105.258  1864  37.047  1892  79.382 
1837  136.261  1865  58.703  1893  -0.952 
1838  114.497  1866  75.973  1894  11 1.169 
1839  109.128  1867  89.403  1895  47.549 
1840  100.920  1868  73.165  1896  96.430 
1841  93.377  1869  110.157  1897  94.164 
1843  99.727  1871  88.436 
1842  97.725  1870  44.993  1898  -1  6.9 14 
Notes: The productivity index is explained in the text of this chapter, and its derivation is described 
in chapter 8. 
Annual productivity index means were calculated (a productivity index number is applied to an 
individual voyage upon its return), and the mean of these annual means formed the comparison 
base for this table. 
ing for a fixed stock should have had, ceteris paribus, an adverse effect on 
productivity. Later, as the industry contracted, hunting pressures would have 
eased and productivity should have risen. 
According to the third explanation, the rapid expansion of  the  1820s and 
1830s must have affected the supply of  vessels. During those decades most 
new whalers were transfers from the merchant fleet. Since carrying goods and 
hunting whales are quite different activities, vessels built for one were not well 
designed for the other. As the whaling fleet expanded, this problem would have 
become more acute. The best-suited vessels would have been chosen first; with 
expansion, progressively less suited vessels would have been used. In the years 14  Chapter 1 
Fig. 1.1 
(mean 1816-98  = 100) 
Source: Data are from table 1.3. 
Index of total factor productivity, New Bedford whaling fleet, 1816-98 
of  contraction  the  process  would  have  been  reversed.  In  fact,  the reversal 
should have been accelerated by the innovation of vessels specifically designed 
for whaling. Also, vessels had to be manned; greater competition would have 
exerted pressure on the supply of experienced labor. The postwar contraction 
should have relieved the problem. (These issues are treated further in chapters 
5 and 8.) 
The Labor Contract. Other labor contracts reward workers on the basis of time 
worked (wages or salaries) or individual output (piece rates); the whaling con- 
tract called for a worker to receive a share (a lay) of the net value of the voy- 
age.15  There was a standard station-to-station structure of lays from captain to 
boy (a station was a position-cooper,  carpenter, cook, etc.), but there were 
vessel-to-vessel differences, and even on the same vessel not all men assigned 
to the same station received the same lay. The lays of New Bedford captains 
ranged from 1/8 to 1/20, and it was not  atypical  for four boatsteerers  on a 
vessel to receive lays varying between 1/70 and 1/100, depending on their ex- 
15. The term luy is sometimes mistakenly used for the cash value of the share, that is, the lay 
multiplied by  the net value of the catch. A lay was expressed as a fraction (perhaps 1/16 for a 
captain or 1/200 for a greenhand), but was often referred to as the reciprocal of the fraction-a 
sixteen or a mo hundred. 15  In Prospect 
perience and skill. The lay system was in use in whaling as early as the seven- 
teenth century. Although  it superficially resembles  the payment  schemes of 
some agricultural and fishing activities, it was very nearly unique.I6 
A whaleman typically took an advance, but was not entitled to any more of 
his income until the voyage ended. This sometimes made for stormy relations 
between officers and crew. (Sixty percent of New Bedford voyages lasted more 
than two years.) Despite that weakness, the system had two characteristics that 
contributed to productivity  and to profits, if not necessarily to the welfare of 
crews. 
First, from the point of view of the owner, it addressed the riskiness of the 
business, Of the 787 vessels in the New Bedford fleet, 272 were lost on whal- 
ing voyages. Since most made several voyages, the risk of loss was much lower 
than the 35 percent those figures suggest; nevertheless, more than 6 percent of 
New Bedford voyages ended in the loss of  the vessel. The lay system, like a 
share-cropping contract, transferred part of this  risk from owner to worker. 
Given the lengths of  voyages, there was also a substantial risk that the catch 
would not be sold profitably. (It is difficult to predict commodity prices years 
in advance.) Part of this risk too was shifted to the worker. On the other side 
of the bargain, the contract offered a risk taker a chance for a big win. In 1880 
dollars, New Bedford captains averaged an income of $98.31 a month (plus 
room and board) between 1840  and 1858, but their incomes ranged from a low 
of $0.66 to a high of $345.34. 
Second, profits aside, the form of the contract had a direct effect on produc- 
tivity. Successful whaling depended on a crew’s close and continued coopera- 
tion. Observe the crew of a small boat attack a whale and the need is obvious. 
Less obviously, cooperation was needed when a carcass was cut in and ren- 
dered or when a vessel faced heavy winds, weather, or surf. Monitoring coop- 
eration is difficult. Wages provide no incentive to work, let alone to cooperate; 
the incentive is provided by the threat of dismissal. Place rates reward individ- 
ual effort, and often penalize  cooperation. Under the lay system, each man’s 
pay depended on the performance of the entire group.” 
Entrepreneurs: Agents and Captains. Team effort characterized the crew of a 
whaler; a similar, if sometimes strained, interdependence existed between its 
16. For a complete analysis of the labor contract and the lay, see Hohman 1928. See also chapter 
5 below. 
17. Writing about the whalemen of Martha’s Vineyard in the late eighteenth century, Crkvecoeur 
([I7821 1912, 121) says, “They have no wages; each draws a certain established share in partner- 
ship with the proprietor of the vessel; by which economy they are all proportionately concerned 
in the success of the enterprise, and all equally alert and vigilant.” Jefferson (1 990, 54)  makes the 
same point about the whalemen of  Nantucket before the Revolution: “Their seamen, instead of 
wages, had a share in what was taken. This induced them to fish with fewer hands, so that each 
had a greater dividend in the profit. It made them more vigilant in seeking game, bolder in pursuing 
it, and parcimonious in all their expences.” 16  Chapter I 
agent and its captain. When a vessel returned to New Bedford from a whaling 
voyage, or entered the fleet from the merchant marine or a builder’s yard, the 
agent prepared it for sea. He oversaw the renewal of masts, spars, and rigging 
and, if needed, the repair of the hull. He replaced lost or broken whalecraft, 
arranged for provisions, and hired the officers and men of the crew. (Some of 
these functions, particularly provisioning and hiring, could be subcontracted 
to others, but the agent kept close track. His profits from the voyage were a 
share of the proceeds-a  strong inducement for him to plan carefully.) 
The agent’s work was not over when the vessel  sailed. The captain made 
day-to-day  sailing  and  hunting  decisions  and,  in  an  emergency,  might  be 
charged  with  more  fundamental  ones,  such  as deciding  whether  a  storm- 
damaged vessel was worth repairing. At the same time, in spite of distance and 
the difficulties  of  communication,  the agent exercised general authority. He 
saw that cash or access to credit was available for supplies or repairs in distant 
ports. He cajoled and berated his captains, urging vigorous hunting and nig- 
gardly expenditures. On the basis of information received from the captain and 
whatever other sources he had, an agent might direct a vessel to what he be- 
lieved would be more productive hunting grounds, or order the captain to sell 
the catch at a foreign port where prices exceeded those at home, or warn him 
to avoid resupplying at San Francisco in 1849, lest the crew desert to the gold 
fields. 
The captain ran the vessel while it was at sea. Since the hunt often took him 
to unexplored waters,  which could contain hidden  shoals and uncharted  is- 
lands, he had to be a better navigator and seaman than his peers in the merchant 
service, who followed charted trade routes. He was charged with refitting, re- 
provisioning,  and recruiting, and, because whaling voyages were long, these 
demands on his management skills were great. He was also charged with locat- 
ing whales and with killing them. He had to understand their migration pat- 
terns; he had to command a whaleboat during the actual hunt; he had to be as 
skilled as any whaling mate with a lance or darting gun. It’s little wonder his 
pay averaged more than three times that of a merchant captain.’* 
The Zndustryk Output. Sperm whales were hunted for sperm oil. In the early 
nineteenth century, it was valued primarily as an illuminant. Later, as the fac- 
tory  system spread, it was  used  to lubricate  high-speed  machinery.  Baleen 
whales were hunted for whale oil and whalebone. Inferior to sperm oil, whale 
oil was the illuminant of the average consumer, and was used to lubricate heavy 
machinery. Whalebone, or baleen, is not true bone but fringed plates of carti- 
lage making up a sieve through which the animal screens seawater in order to 
18. “[Captain] Spicer needed some new rudder gudgeons made and summoned the blacksmith 
. . . to do the job. The man confessed that he was actually not a blacksmith, but had called himself 
a mechanic to escape the [Civil War] draft. , . . Spicer turned to and made the gudgeons himself, 
thereby demonstrating the versatility of  some experienced  shipmasters of  this era” (Stackpole 
1969, 19). 17  In Prospect 
remove food. It was used by  humans when a strong but flexible material was 
needed: in corset stays, whips, and umbrellas, for e~amp1e.l~ 
Sperm oil production increased rapidly from 1815-19  to  1840-44.  Then, 
until the end of the century, it followed a gentle downward trend. The real price 
of sperm oil tracked production fairly closely: it more than doubled between 
1816-20  and the 185Os, but by  1896-1900  had fallen back to its 1816 level. 
The early history of  whale oil production was similar, but the peak of output 
was not reached until 1845-49,  after which time output declined. In the early 
decades the whale oil real-price profile also paralleled that of  sperm oil (its 
price almost doubled between  18  16-20  and  186  1-65).  Thereafter, although 
prices declined, the rate of decline was slower; as late as 1896-1900, the real 
price of whale oil was  still one-third above that of  1816-20.  (See tables 9.8 
and 9.11  .> 
Given the technical complementarity between whale oil and baleen, it is 
surprising that their output trends are not congruent. Although the pattern for 
baleen is also one of rise, stability, and decline (see table 9.8), the increase was 
less steady, and the decline that began in the late 1850s was less rapid. The 
change in the ratio of the output of oil to that of baleen was no doubt influenced 
by a shift in their relative prices (see table 9.1 1).*O The real price of baleen rose 
from $0.08 a pound in  1816-20 to $5.15 in 1891-95,  and the ratio of the price 
of a gallon of whale oil to the price of a pound of baleen fell from 4.5 to 0.1  .*I 
As its relative price rose, some whalemen took only baleen and abandoned the 
rest of the whale, causing oil output to fall sharply relative to baleen output. 
The buoyant market for baleen did not last, however. The invention of specialty 
steels and changes in consumer tastes at the turn of the century combined to 
drive the price of baleen back to its pre- 1820 level. 
19.  To  fifty chosen Sylphs, of special note, 
We trust th’ important charge, the Petticoat: 
Oft have we known that sevenfold fence to fail, 
Though stiff with hoops, and armed with ribs of whale. 
(Alexander Pope, The Rape of  the Lock, canto 2, lines 117-20).  A late-nineteenth-century adver- 
tisement for a bone dealer in Boston lists fifty-three “articles made of whalebone” available from 
him, including probangs (according to Websteri New Collegiate Dictionary a probang is “a slender 
flexible rod with a sponge on one end used esp. for removing obstructions from the esophagus”), 
tongue scrapers, divining rods, plait raisers, shoehorns, billiard cushion springs, policeman’s clubs, 
and painters’ graining combs. 
20. That whaling captains were sensitive to relative prices is suggested by a note in the WSL  22 
December  1874: “A  letter from Capt. Babcock, of  brig Myra, of  Sagharbor, reports her at  St. 
Helena October 12th, having taken 250 bbls. sperm and 400 do. whale oil since May. After filling 
all his casks he fell in with sperm whales, and threw overboard 100 bbls. whale oil to make room 
for the same quantity of sperm.” 
21. These issues are discussed further in chapter 9. The increase in the price of baleen seems to 
have been a consequence of an increase in demand and a more pronounced decrease in supply. 
The decrease in supply was driven by  developments in the market for oil. Oil prices were weak 
enough to discourage whaling; those who persisted earned high prices for their baleen, but not 
much for their oil. 18  Chapter 1 
Principal American whaling ports. Courtesy of the Printing Services department at the 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
1.5  Why New  Bedford? 
Chapters 12 and 13 are concerned with the interrelations between the whal- 
ing fleet of the United States and the fleets of other nations, and references are 
made to both the American and foreign fleets elsewhere as well. Many towns 
served as home ports for the American fleet (see table 3D.1); in 1850, for ex- 
ample, whalers sailed from twenty-two American ports. The focus of most of 
this book is on those that sailed from New Bedford. 
New Bedford is located about fifty miles south of Boston on the west bank 
of the Acushnet River, just above the entry of the river into Buzzards Bay- 19  In Prospect 
highway to the Atlantic. Cape Cod is about twenty miles to the east, across the 
neck of the bay. The two islands, Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket, lie about 
twenty miles to the south-southeast and fifty miles to the east-southeast, re- 
spectively. Within a radius of fifty miles of New Bedford are virtually all of 
the important  East Coast  whaling ports, Mattapoisett,  Fairhaven,  and Dart- 
mouth being the closest. 
Between the 1820s and the 1880s the Americans dominated world whaling. 
It is generally agreed that the nation’s proportion of the world’s total activity 
had reached about 60 percent by the mid- 1830s, and averaged about 70 percent 
throughout the 1840s and 1850~~~  New Bedford stood, in relation to American 
whaling, much as America did in relation to world whaling (see tables 1.1 and 
1.2). In the eighteenth  century Nantucket  had been the center of American 
whaling. Its fleet was destroyed in the Revolutionary War, recovered, and was 
destroyed  again in the War of  1812. Once again it recovered, but was soon 
surpassed in size by the New Bedford fleet, and not long after went into abso- 
lute decline, due to a constellation of economic and ecological  misfortune^.^^ 
By 1823 New Bedford had become the nation’s leading whaling port. Over the 
years 1816  to 1906,  it accounted for more than 45 percent of total U.S.  whaling 
output (see table  1.2). From the mid-1850s to the mid-1880s its share was 
much higher, ranging between 55 and almost 80 percent. At the turn of  the 
century, New Bedford had relinquished its premier standing to San Francisco, 
but by then the tonnage of the U.S.  fleet had fallen by almost 95 percent. 
Not only did New Bedford contribute a large fraction of the total American 
whaling effort, but also the voyages of  its vessels represent  a composite of 
all American  ventures.  Specialization, in whales sought or grounds hunted, 
characterized the fleets of many ports. Nantucket was noted for its sperm whal- 
ers, Provincetown for its plum’pu’dn’rs employed on short voyages in the At- 
lantic, New London for the right-whale fishery and for a willingness to contend 
with the icy seas of Davis Strait and Hudson Bay in the search for bowheads, 
Sag Harbor and Stonington for the northern and southern right-whale fisheries. 
New Bedford vessels went everywhere. Given the relative size and the ubiquity 
of the New Bedford fleet, it is a reasonable proxy for the American industry as 
a whole. 
22. In 1859 Hunrk Merchants’ Mugnzine, quoting an 1834 article in the NorthAmerican Review 
and the “Annual Report of the Secretary of State on Foreign Commerce for 1858:’  estimated that 
400 of the 700 ships engaged in whaling worldwide in 1834 were American registered and that 
the figures for 1858 were 661 of  900 (Growth of  the Whale Trade  1859, 475-76).  Scammon 
([1874] 1968,212) estimates that the figures for 1842 were 652American registered of 882 world- 
wide. Clark (1887a, 2:192) says that in 1846 the United States accounted for 729 vessels of a 
world whaling fleet of nearly 1,000, in 1880, 171 out of “not more than” 250. 
23. One problem was the sandbar at the mouth of Nantucket harbor, which kept larger vessels 
out and became more troublesome as time went by. Another was the expense both of gathering 
supplies to outfit vessels and of dispersing oil, Nantucket being an island. See Mitchell 1949, 7; 
Hohman  1928, 305-6.  Morison (1961, 315) quotes Emerson on New Bedford’s  success: “New 
Bedford is not nearer to the whales than New London or Portland, yet they have all the equipments 
for a whaler ready, and they hug an oil-cask like a brother.” 